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Multi-Employer Bargaining 
The Case of B.C. 
Coast Lumber Industry 
Stuart Jamieson 
The author stresses the point that multi-employer bar-
gaining in a primary or resource-based industry is under 
some circumstances at least, quite différent in character 
and conséquences from its counterpart in other types of 
industries or other contexts. To illustrate his point, he pré-
sents the case of the B.C. Coast Lumber Industry. 
The terms « centralization » and concentration in collective bar-
gaining are usually associated with the concept of « multi-employer » 
or « industry-wide » bargaining on a régional or national scale. In some 
countries, and in a few cases on this continent, the concept bas been 
extended to embrace what might be called « multi-industry, multi-union » 
bargaining. 
Multi-employer bargaining has been built on several bases. For 
example : 
1) a common market for competing producers of a par-
ticular good or service (e.g. fresh mille deliveries in 
a metropolitan area) ; 
2) similar plants or other production facilities for pro-
ducing similar types of goods for a variety of markets 
(e.g. primary steel products in the U.S.) ; 
3) employers utilizing similar technologies or similar 
types of specialized 
labour ; 
and 
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4) firms utilizing the same type of resource in a par-
ticular région or location (e.g. the number industry 
on the B.C. coast). 
I am drawing thèse rather obvious distinctions in order to stress 
a particular point at the outset, namely, that multi-employer bargaining 
in a primary or resource - based industry is, under some circumstances 
at least, quite différent in character and conséquences from its counter-
part in other types of industries or other contexts. In this respect, a 
number of observations that one may make about the Coast lumber in-
dustry of British Columbia probably would apply also to other resource 
based industries, such as the fishing and canning industry of the B.C. 
Coast, and coal-mining and métal mining and smelting in numerous other 
areas of this continent. 
The terms « centralization » and « concentration » are often viewed 
as being related, or almost inséparable. « Centralization », in the in-
dustrial relations context, means that the processes of bargaining and 
decision-making are, to a greater or lesser degree, surrendered by indivi-
dual employer firms or plants, and by union locals, and assumed by 
larger central union and employer association représentatives. « Concen-
tration » tends to accompany « centralization » as an increasing number 
of issues formerly dealt with on a local scale become the subjects of 
bargaining, decision-making and administration by the central executives 
of union and employer associations. (This is not always the case, 
however). 
Most labour economists on this continent seem to feel that cen-
tralized industry-wide bargaining conduces to greater efficiency in labour-
management relations, as measured by a number of criteria. One of the 
strongest cases in this vein was presented in a study by Lester and 
Robie, some twenty-five years ago, of multi-employer bargaining in seven 
industries in the United States 1. Their findings were supported, in large 
part, by later studies by C. Kerr and L. Fisher2, and by F. Pierson3, 
among others. The advantages claimed by thèse authors for multi-
employer bargaining are by now a familiar part of the literature of 
i LESTER, R.A. and E.A. ROBIE, Wages under National and Régional Collective 
Bargaining. Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., Industrial Relations Section, 
Dept. of Economies and Social Institutions, 1946. 
2 KERR, C. and L. FISHER, « Multiple-Employer Bargaining - the San Francisco 
Expérience », R. Lester and J. Shister, eds., Insight into Labour Issues, MacMillan, 
1946. 
3 PIERSON, F. R., Multi-Employer Bargaining, Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania, 1948. 
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industrial relations : it saves time and effort in collective bargaining, 
where one « master contract » can be negotiated for the industry, instead 
of a multiplicity of agreements for each employer firm ; the establish-
ment of standard wages, hours and other conditions of work remove 
labour from compétition without reducing employer incentives to achieve 
greater efficiency and reduce costs in other areas ; greater « wage sta-
bility » is achieved, as wages rise les s rapidly in boom periods and fall 
less rapidly during recessions ; there is less internecine conflict within 
union ranks, as disparities in wages and working conditions are reduced 
among workers doing the same types of jobs for différent employers ; 
union are rendered more secure against the threat of rivalry and dis-
placement from other organizations ; union and employers représentatives 
can be more objective and far-sighted in their bargaining negotiations, 
and take the public interest more into account, as they are farther re-
moved from local pressure and the immédiate interests of their consti-
tuents ; strikes tend to be fewer in number because of thèse various ad-
vantages ; where strikes do occur, of course, on an industry-wide basis 
they tend to be larger, more prolonged and costly, but this fact in itself 
puts greater pressure on unions and employers to bargain rationally and 
reach agreement. And so on. 
Comparative industrial relations studies hâve tended to reach some 
of the same conclusions. A.M. Ross and P. Hartmann in their Changing 
Patterns of Industrial Conflict4, a survey of 15 countries published about 
ten years ago, found that the overall incidence of strikes was far higher 
in Canada and the United States than in other comparably industrialized 
countries in Western Europe. One of the important factors explaining 
this divergence, according to the authors, was the highly « segmented » 
collective bargaining structure on this continent, wherein about two 
thirds of ail agreements are, or were, negotiated between individual em-
ployers and union locals. In most countries of Western Europe, by con-
trast, most workers are governed by collective bargaining agreements 
negotiated by central union bodies and employer associations 5. 
4 Ross, A.M. and P. HARTMANN, Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict, 
New York, 1960. 
5
 In subséquent studies, however, Ross found a tendency for union-employer 
relations and collective bargaining in several West European countries becoming 
more decentralized, and tending towards the North American pattern. (See Ross, 
A. M., « Prosperity and Labour Relations in Western Europe », Industrial and Labour 
Relations Review, Cornell University, October, 1962. 
The much higher incidence of strikes in several West European countries in 
récent years, moreover, would seem to indicate that centralized industry-wide 
bargaining does not, in itself, serve to allay labour unrest and conflict. 
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A number of prevailing trends would seem, for obvious reasons, 
to encourage the growth of centralized multi-employer bargaining in a 
widening range of industries. Technological changes, improvements in 
transportation and communication, and the conséquent broadening of 
markets and sources of supply hâve conduced to growing concentration 
in many industries in fewer but larger corporate units. At the same time, 
there has been growing intégration in corporate ownership or control 
over différent stages of the production process and (not the same thing 
by any means) the significant increase of multi-industry and multi-
product « conglomérâtes » that operate across national boundaries. Such 
developments, among others, hâve forced governments to intervene to 
a growing degree in économie affairs, including labour-employer relations, 
to protect the interests of the public (or some such interests, at least). 
It could be reasonably argued that unions in industries affected by such 
trends, if they are to achieve or maintain any semblance of equality in 
bargaining power and protect the interests of the workers they represent, 
must reorganize their structures to become larger, more centralized bar-
gaining agencies, to merge or consolidate into larger aggregations in some 
cases, and/or to act together more effectively in allied councils or 
associations in others, as various combinations of circumstances would 
seem to call for. 
The B.C. Coast Lumber Industry : A Spécial Case ? 
The perhaps overly-lengthy introduction presented above seems 
necessary as a background for analyzing the lumber industry of coastal 
British Columbia, as one case-study of multi-employer bargaining. The 
industry has been going through the types of changes outlined above. 
But whether the bargaining structure and procédures hâve become more 
« centralized », as would seem logical, is open to question. As will be 
brought out later, some developments indicate a trend in this direction, 
while others suggest the opposite. Such divergences may go far towards 
explaining some of the more peculiar features of labour-management 
relations in the industry. 
One feature stands out above ail, namely, the inordinately high 
incidence of industrial conflict. Multi-employer bargaining on a régional 
scale has applied in the B.C. Coast lumber industry for more than a 
quarter of a century. From the findings of Lester and Robie, and others, 
one would expect therefore that union-employer relations would by this 
time be « mature » and that the industry would stand out as a model 
of harmony and stability. In fact, such relations are anything but mature, 
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stable or harmonious. The lumber industry of the B.C. Coast has ac-
counted for a disproportionate share of industrial strife in the Province, 
as measured by any or ail conceivable indices. During the décade 1949-
59 this one industry, accounting for about 10% of the paid labour force 
in B.C. accounted for about 20% of ail strikes, almost one-half of ail 
strike participants and almost two-thirds of ail man-days lost in strikes 6. 
Two large and protracted strikes in the industry, in 1952 and 1959 alone 
accounted for more days lost than the total for ail other strikes in ail 
other industries in the province during the décade. 
The disproportionate numbers of strike participants and days lost 
in the industry are to be accounted for mainly in a few large « interest » 
disputes that were subject to legally required conciliation procédures in 
the negotiation of new agreements. Coast lumber, however, has also 
experienced a disproportionately large number of illégal « wildcat > 
strikes, which hâve far outnumbered the authorized strikes. 
The industry did not expérience any such large or protracted shut-
downs during the 1960's. On the other hand, as may be seen from Table I, 
the number of wildcat strikes greatly increased, reaching a peak of 21 
in 1969 (and thèse, it should be noted, hâve occured among a labour 
force that has been declining in numbers over the past two décades). 
One industry-wide shutdown, threatened to develop in 1966, and did 
involve more than 6,000 workers. It was settled only through spécial 
measures of pressure by the Provincial Government, which appointed 
a prominent member of the B.C. Suprême Court as a spécial Industrial 
Inquiry Commissioner. Because of his spécial status, he was aible, in 
effect, to impose a sizeable wage seulement on the industry, which served 
to stop the strike. It was widely anticipated that there would be another 
industry-wide shutdown this month (June, 1970) as negotiations for 
a new agreement beginning June 15th broke down early in March. This 
now seems unlikely, as a five-week strike of towboat crews has brought 
widespread layoffs and shutdowns in Coast lumber. 
SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
There are many features more or less spécial to the industry to 
explain this peculiar pattern of conflict. Some of what would appear 
to be major contributing factors are discussed briefly below. 
6
 JAMIESON, S. « Régional Factors in Industrial Conflict : the Case of British 
Columbia », Canadian Journal of Economies and Political Science, Augnst 1962, 
p. 408. 
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TABLE I 
STRIKES IN THE COAST LUMBER INDUSTRY 
IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1949-1969 
Authorized Unauthorized Total 
Year No. Man-Days Lost1 No. Man-Days Lost2 
1949 0 — — — — 
1950 0 — 6 4,977 4,977 
1951 1 90 2 312 402 
1952 1 1,035,000 2 158 1,035,158 
1953 0 — 2 1,850 1,850 
1954 0 — 2 945 945 
1955 2 1,002 5 1,355 2,357 
1956 1 1,665 2 5,667 7,332 
1957 0 — — — — 
1958 0 — 6 2,757 2,757 
1959 2 1,233,950 1 1,125 1,235,075 
1960 0 — 1 1,128 1,128 
1961 0 — 1 42 42 
1962 3 373 3 9,262 9,635 
1963 1 2,163 1 37 2,200 
1964 1 432 2 305 737 
1965 0 — 2 1,140 1,140 
1966 1 86,520 4 1,849 88,369 
1967 0 — 7 7,211 7,211 
1968 3 6,803 11 19,589 26,392 
1969 1 2,196 21 15,553 17,749 
1
 Man-Days lost include only unions involved directly in strikes or lock-outs. 
This figure takes no account for other workers who may hâve refused to cross 
picket lines or for other reasons become unemployed because of strikes. 
Source : B.C. Department of Labour, Annual Reports. 
The Kerr-Siegel Hypoîhesis 
Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel during the mid-1950's carried out 
a comprehensive survey of the « inter-industry propensity to strike », 
covering dozens of industries in 15 countxies. They found a remarkable 
degree of consistency in industrial relations patterns. In almost every 
country surveyed it was found that the industries with the highest in-
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cidence of strikes were mining, longshoring, lumber and textiles. The 
authors attributed the high incidence of strikes to such factors as : the 
large proportion of transient single workers employed in such industries 
(with the exception of textiles and, more recently, longshoring) ; the 
géographie and social isolation of the workers, like a « race apart », 
living in one-industry towns or spécial districts in cities where they hâve 
little contact with other occupational groups or classes ; the limited 
opportunities for a stable family life ; and other spécial hardships or 
limitations associated with work in such industries. Thèse problems 
generate many frustrations and grievances, and, more important, what 
Kerr and Siegel call « the totality of verbally shared grievances » tends 
to develop into a consensus of sentiment hostile to employers (particular-
ly where thèse are absentée owners). To quote : «The strike for the 
isolated mass is a kind of colonial revolt against far removed authority, 
an outlet for accumulated tensions, and a substitute for occupational 
and social mobility » 7. 
Several of thèse observations would help account for the high in-
cidence of conflict in the Coast lumber industry - particularly the pre-
valence of wildeat strikes. Loggers in particular hâve had a long tradition 
of militancy and radical idéologies dating back to the days of the I.W.W. 
arising in large part from the isolated and harsh conditions under which 
many of them had to work. Some of Kerr's and Siegel's conclusions 
would hâve to be rejected, however. Their findings do not explain, for 
instance, why loggers and sawmill workers go on strike more frequently, 
in larger numbers and longer periods of time, on the average, on the 
Coast than in the Northern or Southern Interior régions of the Province, 
or in Ontario, Québec, or the states of Washington and Oregon. Indeed, 
with the greatly improved transportation and communication facilities 
that hâve developed in récent décades, and with the increased concent-
ration of production facilities in a few « key centers », loggers and 
sawmill workers on the Coast are far less isolated than they once were, 
and generally less than their counterparts in other régions of this country. 
Industrial Boundaries, Union Structure and Jurisdiction 
Such considérations lead to another question, namely by what cri-
teria an « industry » is to be defined. This question présents spécial 
difficulties in such matters as job descriptions and negotiated rates of 
7 KERR, C. and SIEGEL, A., « The Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike : an 
International Comparison », in Kornhauser, A., Dubin, R. and Ross, A. M., eds., 
Industrial Conflict, New York, 1954, p. 193. 
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pay, union structure and jurisdiction, and the appropriate areas of col-
lective bargaining. 
Let us consider the Coast lumber industry itself. Logging opérations 
vary in size from large camps employing hundreds of men, to small 
opérations employing only a handful. In the former case, there is a high 
degree of specialization and division of labour, with dozens of job class-
ifications, each paying a différent wage according to degree of skill, 
etc., while in the smaller opérations every worker has to be a sort of 
« jack of ail trades ». Discrepancies are fréquent in such situations, and 
give rise to disputes and wildcat strikes. 
Again, there is the division between Coast and Interior. In previous 
years logging and lumber opérations on the Coast hâve differed so 
markedly from the Interior régions of the Province - in climatic and 
topographical conditions, in size and species of trees, in techniques of 
logging, in size and scale of sawmilling opérations, in markets, and in 
types of labour employed - as to be deemed separate industries. Data 
compiled by Fédéral and Provincial government departments hâve usually 
drawn distinctions between the two and thèse hâve been also reflected 
in spécial divisions or « sub-districts », within the I.W.A., which deal 
with separate employer associations. 
A growing similarity has developed in récent years in the lumber 
industry as between thèse différent régions in the province. This has 
been a resuit of greatly improved transportation facilities, growing com-
pétition in some of the same markets, the adoption of similar techniques 
and equipment that favor larger scale opérations, and a forest policy 
by the provincial government that encourages concentration of opérations 
in the hands of large integrated concerns. This growing similarity and 
compétition, were manifested in a protracted strike of logging and saw-
mill workers in Southern Interior of B.C. in 1967, in which the central 
issue was the demand for wage parity with their counterparts of the Coast. 
A further question of defining industries, with accompanying pro-
blems of jurisdiction, arises from the trend towards growing intégration 
in large concerns. To an increasing extent, as noted earlier, the prevail-
ing trends in technology and markets, coupled with government forest 
management license policy, encourage large concerns to acquire control 
over an increasing proportion of forest resources, and to use an in-
creasing proportion of their logging output for the production of products 
other than lumber (e.g. pulp and paper, hardboard, rayon and other 
synthetics). Close intégration is favoured where wood chips and slabs 
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from sawmills are used for producing such products. This trend tends 
to generate some jurisdictional problems and pressure for closer co-
opération, and possible amalgamation, between the I.W.A. (representing 
logging and lumber workers) and the unions of pulp and paper workers, 
particularly the industrial-type union of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill 
Workers. The larger employer firms while carrying out major steps of 
intégration on their own, as described, hâve exhibited considérable host-
ility to similar tendencies on the part of unions 8. 
Basic Instability of the Lumber Industry 
The lumber industry, like construction (and, of course, depending 
on the latter as a basic item of input) is subject to severe seasonal and 
often unforeseen and erratic cyclical fluctuations in sales, prices, output 
and employment. It also faces the hazards of unforeseen and unpredict-
able climatic conditions (e.g. drought, unusually heavy snowfall, etc.) 
that may shut down logging and sawmilling opérations for weeks, or 
even months, at a time. There are also the uncertainties of J'oreign 
markets, what with sudden changes in import quotas, exchange rates, 
and the like, that tend to hâve a major impact upon an industry that 
exports almost three-quarters of its total output to highly compétitive 
markets. And finally, there has been the rapid rate of technological change 
in both major branches of the industry and in conséquence, large-scale 
displacement of labour. As may be seen from tables 2 and 3, employment 
in Coast logging declined by about 20% from 1949 to 1969, and in 
sawmilling by about 2 5 % , in the same period. 
Thèse déclines in employment, as may be seen from the tables, 
hâve been accompanied, and explained largely by, dramatic increases 
in output per man-hour. 
Thèse sources of uncertainty and insecurity, particularly for labour, 
render it difficult to achieve a stable and rational climate for collective 
bargaining and the administration of agreements. 
Unjavourabîe Comparisons with Other Industries 
Coast lumber in collective bargaining negotiations and industrial 
relations generally opérâtes within a rather narrow « orbit of coercive 
8
 This was exemplified in March 1970, when employer représentatives abruptly 
walked out of the first negotiating session for a new agreement, because the 
negotiating committee of the union included the International Représentative of the 
Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers, as well as the Secretary of the B. C. Fé-
dération of Labour. 
TABLE LT 
AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES IN B.C. 
(t per hour) 
Date 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 
Construction 158 168 193 195 208 214 216 223 238 259 282 282 286 293 303 308 334 368 396 429 
Forestry 
(Coast Logging) 135 146 169 177 182 181 186 193 207 213 223 235 234 244 253 263 280 300 321 346 
Saw Mills 134 148 169 170 171 177 177 181 203 203 208 215 219 227 235 247 257 282 301 325 
Pulp & Paper 133 141 171 180 186 189 197 207 209 218 221 247 247 252 266 278 283 325 343 352 
Mining 111 121 146 142 152 163 167 175 182 194 197 208 211 211 218 229 240 271 286 314 
SOURCE: Canada Department of Labour, Wage Rates, Salaries, and Hours of Employment, 1969. 
TABLE III 
EMPLOYMENT INDEXES IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES IN B.C. 
(1949 = 100) 
Date 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 
Construction 100 92.2 102.1 129.8 150.7 108.3 106.8 148.1 159.5 97.0 102.5 89.2 78.6 82.8 84.3 95.9 121.5 138.8 150.4 
Coast Logging 2 100.0 121.1 106.1 94.9 92.8 95.0 108.3 86.7 80.0 81.7 78.3 78.3 77.8 78.3 78.9 82.2 78.9 72.2 
Lumbering 100 107.9 119.8 96.1 101.6 101.5 110.9 113.1 97.6 91.6 92.5 99.7 94.8 99.9 104.4 105.9 106.6 106.5 98.4 
Saw Mills (Coast) 100 115 112 102 105 105 97 89 89 82 77 77 72 75 76 78 78 78 77 
Pulp & Paper 100 89.8 107.5 116.4 123.1 137.2 141.8 143.4 137.5 143.6 165.4 175.6 188.0 198.3 210.3 225.4 238.2 269.2 273.2 
Mining 100 107.3 107.6 121.9 104.3 92.5 95.0 97.3 91.0 73.5 71.1 70.4 71.1 76.6 82.6 80.7 82.9 90.1 90.4 
Transport (motor) 100 99.3 94.7 91.0 87.4 85.4 87.8 90.0 96.3 101.4 102.9 103.8 104.8 110.4 117.9 121.1 131.0 154.9 164.4 
Service 100 94.3 95.7 96.6 98.6 102.4 112.1 124.1 127.3 124.0 121.8 125.9 129.5 136.7 142.9 163.2 170.7 189.5 
SOURCES DBS, Annual Review of Man-Hours & Hourly Earnings. 
AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATE 
1. Includes forestry (logging) saw and planing mill employment for Britith Columbia as a whole. Reliable data for thèse two aspects of the lumber 
industry were found impossible to get for the interior région. 
2. (1950 = 100) 
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comparison », to use Arthur Ross's remark again. It is comparable to, 
and inseparably linked with, two other major industries in the Province, 
namely, construction and pulp and paper production. 
The construction industry appears to be of major importance in 
affecting worker attitudes and union bargaining objectives in the lumber 
industry. At this point I can do not better than quote from an analysis 
I made some ten years ago, regarding the relationship between the 
two9 10. It seems to apply more than ever today, after several years of 
an unprecedented construction « boom » in British Columbia. 
« The complicated interrelationships between the two industries 
- particularly as regards labour and union organizations - are provo-
cative of maladjustment and conflict. Certain broad similarities in 
conditions of employment, on the one hand, lead workers in the two 
industries to look upon themselves as comparable, and each group is 
within the other's « orbit of coercive comparison » to use Arthur 
Ross's phrase. Both industries are largely in the capital goods category, 
and their workers are particularly vulnérable to seasonal and cyclical 
fluctuations in investment, output, and employment. There is a similar 
range and variety of skills between the two main groups and a number 
of occupations, particularly in mechanical work and maintenance, are 
virtually identical in logging, sawmilling, and construction. This factor 
has led, incidentally, to numerous jurisdictional disputes. And finally, 
on the Pacific Coast there has been intense compétition for leadership 
and prestige, and at times bitter rivalry, between the International 
Woodworkers of America and certain major building trades unions 
for several years. 
The two industries differ markedly, on the other hand, as regards 
such matters as the size and nature of their respective markets, 
structures and techniques of production, and elasticity of demand for 
labour. Equal or similar collective bargaining demands in the two 
industries, therefore, corne up against différent price and cost condi-
tions and différent employer attitudes and policies. Where the demand 
for construction goods tends to be price inelastic in the short run, in 
lumber it tends to be highly elastic. Where employers in the construction 
industry produce almost entirely for a local or régional market, and 
thus collectively hâve some control over the priées they can charge 
for their product, the lumber industry in British Columbia produces 
largely for export to the United States and overseas markets in close 
9 As noted earlier, employment in both logging and sawmilling on the coast 
hâve declined substantially over the past two décades, while in the construction 
industry it increased by more than 50% between 1949 and 1969 (though subject 
to very severe fluctuations in the intervening years. It almost doubled from 1961 
to 1969. Similarly in rates of pay. 
10 JAMIESON, S., « Régional Factors in Industrial Conflict : The Case of British 
Columbia » The Canadian Journal of Economies and Political Science, August 1962. 
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compétition with other producing areas, and therefore has little 
or no control over the priées it can charge. Organization and collective 
bargaining in the construction industry in British Columbia, though 
operating on a larger scale than in most provinces, is still highly 
segmented and compétitive, as noted earlier. Hitherto this has operated 
to the advantage of the unions in terms of bargaining power and wage 
or fringe-benefit gains, at least in the short run. In the lumber industry, 
by comparison, the union is industrial in structure, encompassing ail 
types of workers, and it bargains collectively with ail major employers 
acting as a unit, on a régional scale. And finally, where technological 
change has had a very limited impact on the construction industry, 
in terms of overall displacement of labour, in logging and sawmilling 
it has been rapid and drastic in its employment effetcs. From 1949 
to 1956 it made possible unusually large increases in output and 
profits for major firms in the industry without any appréciable increase 
in the size of the labour force. In gênerai, then, the Woodworkers' 
union, while under pressure from its members to seek gains comparable 
to those won by the main unions in the construction industry, has 
been weaker in bargaining power, and has been faced with a group 
or larger and more unified employers who hâve had stronger incen-
tives, and greater financial resources, to resist the union's demands. 
Wage increase for construction workers, consequently, were far 
larger than for lumber workers during the 1950's, and on those occa-
sions where the latter made serious efforts to achieve parity with the 
former, protracted, industry-wide shut-downs resulted ». 
Average weighted hourly wage rates in construction were above 
those in logging (forestry) and sawmilling by about 250 an hour in 1949. 
Since then the gap has widened considerably, and in récent years the 
differential has been $1 an hour or more. (Incidentally, the figures in 
Tables 1 and 2 would seem to indicate that, in thèse industries at least, 
unions do seem to hâve a bargaining-power effect on wages, more-
or-less indépendant of the market. There seems to be very little relation-
ship between hourly wage rates and employment except in the short 
run, such as when a major boom in the construction industry créâtes 
shortages of skilled labour). 
Labour in Coast lumber compares its position unfavourably also 
with its counterparts in the pulp and paper industry. While the former 
group suffers job insecurity, fréquent layoffs, and declining employment 
opportunities in the long run, the latter hâve generally enjoyed stable, 
year-round opérations, and a rapid and almost continuous increase in 
employment, with favourable prospects for the future. Average hourly 
rates in pulp and paper hâve also remained somewhat higher, and hâve 
risen at about the same rate as in logging and sawmilling over the past 
two décades. 
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Where lumber and construction in B.C. hâve been among the most 
« strike-prone » in the Province, pulp and paper has been relatively 
strike-free. The industry has experienced only one major shutdown, that 
of 1957-58, in almost 50 years. The bargaining policy of unions and 
employers in the industry has been, usually, to wait until negotiations 
in Coast lumber hâve been settled, with or without a strike, then-to settle 
for roughly the same percentage increases. Lumber workers, in effect 
hâve served as « stalking horses » for pulp and paper workers, who 
thereby avoid the cost of strikes (though a sufficiently large and pro-
tracted strike in logging can lead in time to large layoffs). Thèse différ-
ences in the positions of workers in the two groups of industries hâve 
been a major factor inhibiting amalgamation of their respective unions. 
Union Structure and Internai Government 
While they differ strongly on many issues, on one point at least 
most union and management spokesmen seem to be in agreement it is 
that one of the major problems of collective bargaining, and of industrial 
relations generally, in B.C. Coast lumber, lies in the constitution, or-
gainizational structure and internai institutional political problems of 
the union that has exclusive jurisdiction in the industry, namely, the 
International Woodworkers of America, or I.W.A. If one could sum 
up the situation in one sentence, it is this : The union is too démocratie 
in structure and procédures to function effectively in a multi-employer 
bargaining System, in an industry that is becoming increasingly central-
ized in its opérations. As one prominent union officiai puts it : 
«There is intolérable tension in the union between being démocratie 
and being effective. There is a staggering variety of problems at 
both the local and régional levels, that the union is simply not 
equipped to handle effectively » X1. 
His counterpart in the employer association, Forest Industrial Re-
lations, states it simply as follows : 
«The main union leaders are too busy politicising, mending their 
fences and trying to secure their positions with the membership, to 
do the sort of job that they are supposed to be doing ». 
The constitution of the I.W.A., to begin with, assures a high degree 
of autonomy to its subsidiary bodies. Basically, the main « districts » of 
the union - as the major administrative units - hâve a high degree of 
n Field notes and interviews. 
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autonomy in relation to the International Executive. This applies part-
icularly to British Columbia which, as District No. 1, is by far the largest 
in the union, in terms both of geographical area and total membership. 
Unlike most Canadian branches of international unions, for instance, the 
elected District Executive appoints the International Représentatives and 
other full-time staff for the District, whose salaries are paid by the 
International. The positions of the elected District Executive members, 
however, suffer a degree of political insecurity that is felt equally by the 
appointed staff members. 
Within British Columbia, in turn, and particularly in the Coast lum-
ber sector, there is a high degree of autonomy of the major locals in relation 
to the District Executive. The (extrême) degree to which this has developed 
can be attributed to a variety of factors : the constitution of the I.W.A. ; 
government policies regarding certification and décision - making by 
union locals ; the structure of the industry, and the division of labour 
this has created ; and the spécial traditions, idéologies and attitudes of 
various major occupational groups in the industry's labour force. 
The Coastal « sub-district » of the I. W. A. consists mainly of a few 
large locals and se ver al smaller ones. On the mainland, loggers « Local » 
No 171 with some 6,000 members, extends in jurisdiction from the U. S. 
border to the Arctic Circle (i. e. in the Yukon territory). There has been 
a long tradition, among loggers in this and other areas of the Coast, of a 
radical démocratie ideology and suspicion of central authority, particularly 
where, as in the I.W.A. représentatives of sawmill and other woodworkers 
tend to dominate the top executive positions. This attitude is partly a matter 
of « craft pride » of the primary workers as expressed in contempt for the 
« inside » processing workers. It is broadly similar to that of miners in 
relation to smelting and refining employées in the metals industry - a 
major factor accounting for the difficulties that the United Steelworkers 
of America faced in their long-drawn-out and exceedingly expensive 
campaign to dislodge and absorb the International Union of Mine Mill 
and Smelter Workers. 
The largest local of the I.W.A. on the B.C. Coast is No. 1-217, 
comprised mainly of sawmill and related woodworkers in Vancouver. 
The Président and other executives of this organization with the support 
of a few other locals, hâve been more radically oriented in ideology and 
policy. They hâve expressed strong opposition to the District Executive on 
various issues, and hâve run as opposition candidates in several élections 
for District Executive board positions. 
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Some large I.W.A. locals on Vancouver Island include both logging 
and sawmill workers, while other smaller ones are more specialized in 
membership. 
The I.W.A. in British Columbia, in brief, comprises for the most 
part a few large local unions with strong and outspoken leaders, and a 
number of smaller, more compliant ones. This structure in itself tends to 
generate intense factionalism and struggles for power to control policy 
at the District level. 
Factionalism and internai political conflict tend to be further inten-
sified by ideological différences, among prominent union leaders and 
rank-and-file alike. The majority of logging, sawmill and related wood-
workers on the Coast comprise a relatively well-paid group. A large 
minority, possibly a majority, could be classed as politically neutral or 
conservative. At any rate in a number of the more important lumber 
centers of the Province, in both Coast and Interior, the Social Crédit 
Party has continued enjoy a majority of votes for many years. A sizeable 
minority, however, represented by a number of outspoken and influential 
local union leaders, including those of the largest local, No. 1-217 of 
Vancouver, express idéologies that are, to varying degrees, to the left 
of the New Démocratie Party (with which most members of the District 
Executive tend to be identified). Thèse dérive from a long tradition of 
radicalism among lumber workers, particularly loggers in British Colum-
bia. It dates back to the organizational activities of the Industrial Workers 
of the World, or I.W.W., prior to and during World War I ; the One Big 
Union, or O.B.U. in the immédiate postwar years ; and, during the 1930's, 
the Workers Unity League of the Communist Party. 
The origins of the I.W.A. lay with the latter. During the mid-1930's, 
lumber workers in the Pacific Northwest, including British Columbia, 
were put under the jurisdiction of the Carpenters' Union of the A.F.L., 
in a distinctly second-class status. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs 
led to a breakway movement in 1937, under the leadership of Commu-
nist organizers, to form a separate industrial-type union of lumber 
workers who would be independent of the carpenters. When the C.I.O. 
was expelled from the A.F.L. in 1938 and reorganized as the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations, the new lumberworkers' organization, under 
its présent name, the International Woodworkers of America, became one 
of its first affiliâtes. Its first International Président was Harold Pritchett, 
of British Columbia, an avowed Communist. 
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After World War II there was a concerted campaign within the C.I.O. 
to dislodge Communists from executive positions in its major affiliâtes. 
Pntchett was defeated as Président of the I.W.A. in the mid-1940's but 
he and his allies managed to retain control of the British Columbia district 
until 1949. In that year the International Executive of the I.W.A., with 
the assistance of the Canadian Congress of Labour, or C.C.L. (Canadian 
counterpart of the C.I.O.) « moved in on » the B.C. District to remove 
the Communist leadership from control. Pritchett and his allies on the 
B.C. District Executive, seeing the « hand writing on the wall », attempted 
to forestall this campaign by separating the B.C. District from the I.W.A. 
and reorganizing it as a new, autonomous organization called the Canadian 
Woodworkers Industrial Union, or C.W.I.U. The new organization, while 
having a substantial minority of adhérents, failed in its efforts to gain 
certification from the Provincial government and récognition from the 
major employers in B.C. It soon declined and disappeared. 
Thèse struggles of the left-wing minority to retain control of the 
union, while unsuccessful, hâve nonetheless left a strong residue of ideo-
logical and policy différences and factional divisions within the organization 
that are stiÙ all-too-evident today. The internecine conflicts of the I.W.A. 
are such that the union cannot function with full effectiveness in the 
negotiation and administration of îndustry-wide collective bargaining agree-
ments. In the face of growing centralization and intégration from the 
employer side, as described earlier, the union remains divided and de-
centralized. 
This atmosphère créâtes numerous problems for the union, not least 
among which is a « crisis of leadership », a « hemorrhage of ability », a 
« brain drain », or however one may describe the situation. At any rate, 
the fact is that more than a half dozen of the more able union leaders at 
the district and some local executive levels hâve left the I.W.A. to take 
better-paid and more secure executive jobs with management, government 
and in one case, the Canadian Labour Congress. An unknown number 
of other, very promising younger officiais of undoubted ability (several of 
whom are known personally to this writer) hâve been discouraged from 
running for office in view of the apparently turbulent and uncertain affairs 
of the union. 
Employers and Their Association 
It is a safe generalization to state that some of the most enlightened 
and public-spirited citizens of British Columbia are top executives of the 
Coast lumber industry. But it is equally safe to state that B.C. lumber 
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executives also include within their ranks some of the most arrogant and 
reactionary employers, whose philosophies are reminiscent of the more 
prominent « Robber Barons » of the United States during the latter 19th 
century. This is to be excepted to some degree, of course, in an industry 
that has had a long tradition of exploitation of labour and resources, and 
corruption of public officiais at ail levels, in the course of its évolution. 
(One top officiai of a leading corporation in the industry has never been 
known to hâve attended any joint labour-management conférence, sympo-
sium or seminar, much less any sort of informai social occasion that 
might serve to facilitate better communication between union and mana-
gement). It is perhaps a safe generalization to say that most senior 
management personnel in the industry, particularly a number in the largest 
firms, are essentially anti-union in philosophy. That is to say, they view 
the union as an essentially « alien » entity that can play no positive rôle 
in the opérations of the industry. They feel that it infringes on manage-
ments « prérogatives » and inhibits its efficiency, and therefore must be 
curbed and fought, by force of law as well as by industry's bargaining-
power. 
This is not to say that there is a really effective « united front » of 
Coast lumber industry firms against the union. While business spokesmen 
do not « wash their dirty linen in public » and air their différences as 
openly as do unions, on a number of issues over the past several years it 
has been apparent that there hâve been strong conflicts of viewpoint within 
the ranks of the employers, including the six or seven largest firms. But 
when the « chips are down » the views of the leading concern - MacMillan 
Bloedel and Powell River - a conglomerate capitalized at more than $700 
million dollars - tend to prevail, as many smaller logging and sawmilling 
opérations dépend upon this giant concern for their survival. 
Understandably, in this sort of industrial structure, Forest Industrial 
Relations, the association that negotiates with the I.W.A. in multi-employer 
bargaining on a régional scale, has very limited, if any, real autonomy or 
control over the policies of its member firms - particularly the larger 
ones - and thus, in the final analysis, it has limited effectiveness as a 
« bargaining agent ». 
Provincial Government Labour Relations Policy 
Provincial government policy in British Columbia, as regards the 
Coast lumber industry, seems amorphous and contradictory and on ba-
lance, favourable to the employers at the expense of the union. On the 
one hand, as described earlier, the policy of « forest management licences » 
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encourages concentration of the industry and its resources in the hands 
of a few large integrated concerns. The requirements for union certification 
and collective bargaining, on the other hand, militate against effective 
« industry-wide » collective bargaining. Under the terms of the Labour 
Relations of 1954, which was superseded by the Médiation Commission 
Act of 1969, the régional organization or « district » of the I.W.A. has 
no légal status as such. Certification of « appropriate bargaining units » 
applies only to local unions and local companies, or their plants. This 
applies likewise to legally required « strike votes », as to acceptance or 
rejection of a conciliator or conciliation board's recommendations. Thus, 
even if an overwhelming majority of the industry's workers as a whole 
rejected a conciliation award, if a majority of a particular company's 
employées (or plant of that company) voted otherwise, workers in that 
particular company, or plant, could not legally join the strike. Negotiations 
between the coastal subdivision of the I.W.A. and F.R.A. therefore, are 
designed to arrive at what might be called a « mémorandum of agreement » 
setting out mutually acceptable wage rates, hours of work, etc., the terms 
of which hâve to be ratified by the employées and managements of 
individual companies or plants thereof (whichever are defined as « appro-
priate bargaining agents » under prevailing législation). Whether or not 
this System constitutes « industry-wide bargaining » is an open question. 
But certainly it tends to undermine any sort of orderly bargaining on a 
régional scale. For it tends to vest the main powers of decision-making, 
particularly as regards strike or lockout action, in the hands of the main 
employer firms and union locals. Thus it tends to exacerbate internecine 
divisions and conflicts within the ranks of union and employer organiza-
tions alike. 
How is one to explain government policy of this apparently incon-
sistent kind ? The only explanation that makes sensé to this writer is 
political. The continuée! success of the Social Crédit (or Socred) govern-
ment of British Columbia, of remaining in power in the face of the strong 
opposition of the N.D.P., can be explained in large part by its ability to 
présent itself to the business and propertied community as a « bulwark 
against socialism ». 
The N.D.P. has had to dépend upon organized labour as its main 
base for organized popular support. A strong, well organized and co-
ordinated lumber workers' union firmly established in the province's 
major resource-based industry, would provide a major source of support 
and a rallying point, potentially, for an organized labour movement that 
would give the N.D.P. a firm foundation. A large but disorganized union 
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that accounts for a disproportionate share of the province's labour unrest, 
however, is a political asset to the Socreds. They can présent themselves 
to business and the voting public as the only force capable of saving the 
Province from domination by an « irresponsible > labour movement. 
The Provincial Government has initiated some new and controversial 
measures in récent years. The Médiation Commission Act of January, 
1969, among other provisions, gives the Cabinet the power in effect to 
impose compulsory arbitration in any labour dispute that is deemed to 
constitute a serious threat to the public welfare. Numerous observers 
speculate that an industry-wide strike in lumber would présent the Pro-
vincial Government with its first real test under the new act. 
A new pièce of proposed législation, Bill 22, was introduced into 
the Législature is the Spring of 1970. It provides for certification of 
employer associations, on the same basis as unions, giving them exclusive 
authority to bargain on behalf of their members. Several union spokesmen 
hâve expressed the fear that this bill would give an employers association 
in an industry such as Coast lumber more centralized authority and coor-
dination of strategy than the union has been able to achieve. 
Union-Employer Relationships and the « Climate » of Bargaining 
Labour-management relations in the Coast lumber industry, as the 
analysis so far suggest, are characterized by a considérable degree of 
mutual suspicion and hostility. Thèse attitudes are exacerbated, as noted, 
by the basic instability of the industry and the insecurity it générâtes, as 
well as by certain government policies described. 
A further complication arises from the déplorable lack of adéquate 
statistical and other économie research data about the lumber industry. 
It is a fact that reliable data of thèse kinds are far less available for 
lumber - by far the most important industry in the Province - than for 
other industries of much lesser importance, such as mining, fishing and 
secondary manufacturing. This generalization applies alike to Fédéral 
and Provincial Government statistics. There is literally no way of getting 
really accurate, up-to-date estimâtes of the total number of logging and 
sawmill opérations and of total employment, from which to dérive accurate 
calculations of such important items as changes in productivity, hourly 
earnings, unit labour and capital costs, and the like. 
Thèse lacunae, together with the numerous other uncertainties that 
beset the industry, put collective bargaining in something of a vacuum. 
The union délégation présents its brief justifying its wage demands on the 
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basis largely of D.B.G. statistics on productivity, hourly earnings, changes 
in the labour and capital shares of the industry's total revenue, and so on. 
Spokesmen of the employer association challenge the accuracy of D.B.G. 
estimâtes but are unable to présent reliable estimâtes of their own because, 
in this highly compétitive industry, the 160-odd memberfirms - and parti-
cularly the larger ones - are unwilling to provide data that they deem 
« confidential ». So the bargaining process soon develops into a straight 
power-play. The Provincial Government, by virtue of its control over 
vital forestry resources, and its unusual « residual powers » under prevailing 
labour disputes législation, is occasionnally able, in effect, to impose a 
seulement on the parties. 
Conclusion — an Overview 
Multi-employer bargaining on a régional scale has been in opération 
in the Coast lumber industry of B.C. for almost three décades, as noted 
earlier. Over the past twenty years in particular the industry has undergone 
almost revolutionary changes in technology, structure and organization, 
as well as in government policies and régulations under which it has to 
operate. Among the more important of thèse changes hâve been the 
substitution of logging by truck rather than by railway ; the rapid mecha-
nization or « automatization •» of logging and sawmill opérations, with 
the conséquent great increases in capital investment per worker, and in 
output per man hour, and the declining volume of employment in both 
branches of the industry ; and finally, the growing concentration and 
intégration of the industry. To an increasing degree, forestry resources 
and capital in the Coast lumber industry hâve corne under the control 
of a few large corporate enterprises, and thèse tend increasingly, as 
noted, to use the raw material for the production of pulp and paper, 
rayon and other synthetics, rather than lumber. 
It is difficult, however, to discern any significant impact of such 
major developments on the organizational structure, ideology or policies 
of the main union, the I.W.A. ; on employer attitudes or policies vis-à-vis 
the union ; on the « climate » or « pattern » of collective bargaining ; or 
on the frequency or incidence of conflict in the industry. 
How is one to assess the « efficiency » of a collective bargaining 
relationship in any particular industry ? Technical efficiency in production, 
low costs, high profits, and ability to survive and grow in highly com-
pétitive markets - ail of which a number of major firms in the Coast 
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lumber of B. C. hâve achieved - are presumably unsuitable or insufficient 
criteria. For, under certain assumptions (and thèse are probably in line 
with the beliefs of most employers in the industry) such advantages could 
hâve been achieved more effectively if, by some sort of magie, there had 
been no unions and no protracted and tiresome collective bargaining 
negotiations - not to mention strikes - to contend with. 
One acceptable but overly-simple criterion of « efficiency » in col-
lective bargaining might be the ability of a union to protect and enhance 
the interests of its members, as measured by the achievement of such 
things as greater job security, and wage and fringe benefit increases in 
line with those of workers in comparable industries, without incurring 
disproportionate losses from strikes and lockouts. The achievement of 
such gains would require, not only strength and cohesiveness from the 
union side, but also flexibility on the employer side. 
Another broader and more ambiguous measure of collective bargain-
ing efficiency would be the achievement of a stable and rational means 
of communication between labour and management, and the formulation 
of means by which the major labour problems of an industry could be 
settled, if not entirely solved, without an inordinate amount of conflict 
and économie loss to workers, employers, and the public generally. 
In terms of either of thèse latter two criteria, multi-employer 
bargaining in the B. C. Coast lumber industry would hâve to be deemed 
inefficient. In brief, it appears to présent a striking example of « cultural 
lag » or obsolescence in its industrial relations « System » in terms of the 
context in which it has to carry on its opérations. 
One can only speculate about the reasons for this failure of adjust-
ment. Lester and Robie and some other authors quoted at the beginning 
of this paper had perhaps overly-optimistic views regarding the virtues 
of multi-employer bargaining on an industry-wide scale. Their conclusions 
seem to hâve been based largely upon a sort of « model » derived from 
a few industries having the following characteristics, among others : 
1) Employers represented in the bargaining in the aggregate 
account for a major share of the market for the products (s) they 
represent, and thus hâve a considérable degree of control over priées. 
The costs of higher wages and fringe benefits can thus be covered, to a 
large degree, by price increases and/or by higher productivity. 
2) There is relative price stability in the industry, and favourable 
prospects for increasing sales, output and employment in the longrun ; 
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3) The union or unions involved are relatively centralized in 
goveramental structure, and relatively free from internai factionalism and 
jurisdictional rivalry from competing organizations ; and 
4) There is a relatively high degree of autonomy, in a sensé, in 
the terms of référence under which collective bargaining can be carried 
on if the union (s) and employers involved are not too subject to « orbits 
of coercive comparison » with wages and conditions of work in other 
similar, comparable, or closely related industries. Thus considérable 
flexibility is possible for both parties in the bargaining process. 
In an industry in which one or more of thèse conditions is lacking -
and in the lumber industry of the British Columbia Coast ail of them 
apparently are - multi-employer bargaining on an industry-wide scale 
does not achieve results which most observers would deem to be « effi-
cient » or « désirable ». 
LA NÉGOCIATION MULTI-EMPLOYEUR : 
L'EXPLOITATION FORESTIÈRE EN COLOMBIE-BRITANNIQUE 
Les termes centralisation et concentration en négociation collective réfèrent 
habituellement au concept de la négociation multi-employeur ou par branche d'in-
dustrie sur une échelle régionale ou nationale. Partant de ces concepts, nous main-
tenons que la négociation multi-employeur dans une industrie dite primaire est, du 
moins en certaines circonstances entièrement différente en nature et en conséquences 
de la négociation de même type dans d'autres secteurs et contextes. 
L'INDUSTRIE DES MATÉRIAUX DE CONSTRUCTION 
La fréquence des conflits industriels caractérise cette industrie de la Colom-
bie-Britannique malgré le fait que la négociation multi-employeur y existe sur une 
base régionale depuis plus de vingt-cinq ans. Non seulement y compte-t-on un bon 
nombre de grèves légales, mais également une profusion de grèves sauvages encore 
plus grandes en nombre. 
LES CAUSES DU CONFLIT 
Les causes du conflit sont nombreuses et complexes et souvent interdépendan-
tes. Voici celles qui nous apparaissent les plus importantes : 
1. L'hypothèse de Kerr-Seigel 
Ces deux auteurs attribuent la grande fréquence de grève dans cette industrie 
à des facteurs tels la grande proportion d'employés temporaires, l'isolation géo-
graphique et sociale des travailleurs et la difficulté d'avoir une vie de famille stable. 
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2. Les frontières industrielles, la srtucture et la juridiction syndicales 
La difficulté de définir l'industrie mène à de sérieux problèmes d'évaluation 
des tâches, de négociation de taux de salaires, de structure et de juridiction syndi-
cale, surtout lorsqu'on considère les différences entre l'industrie côtière des maté-
riaux de construction et celle du centre de la province. 
3. L'instabilité propre de cette industrie due à des fluctuations cycliques et saison-
sonières. 
4. Les comparaisons avec des industries de la construction et de la pulpe et du 
papier affectent nettement les travailleurs de l'industrie des matériaux de cons-
truction. 
5. La structure syndicale et le gouvernement interne de l'International Wood-
workers of America sont problématiques. 
6. L'attitude anti-syndicale des employeurs et de leur association. 
7. L'attitude amorphe, contradictoire et pro-patronale de la politique de relations 
du travail du gouvernement provincial. 
8. L'hostilité dans les relations syndicales, le climat de non confiance dans la 
négociation collective et le manque de données statistiques et économiques. 
CONCLUSION 
La série de changements technologiques à l'intérieur de l'industrie des maté-
riaux de construction en Colombie-Britannique depuis vingt-cinq ans n'a pas pro-
voqué de modifications majeures ni du côté syndical, ni du côté patronal en ce 
qui a trait aux attitudes de l'un vis-à-vis l'autre. Alors comment évaluer l'efficacité 
de la négociation collective dans cette industrie ? Serait-ce par l'efficacité technique, 
par les gains syndicaux, par les moyens de communication entre les partis ? Si l'on 
ne considère que les deux derniers critères, il semble de toute évidence que la 
négociation multi-employeur dans cette industrie a été inefficace en Colombie-
Britannique. 
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